论文标题
部分可观测时空混沌系统的无模型预测
Strategically revealing capabilities in General Lotto games
论文作者
论文摘要
储层计算是预测湍流的有力工具，其简单的架构具有处理大型系统的计算效率。然而，其实现通常需要完整的状态向量测量和系统非线性知识。我们使用非线性投影函数将系统测量扩展到高维空间，然后将其输入到储层中以获得预测。我们展示了这种储层计算网络在时空混沌系统上的应用，该系统模拟了湍流的若干特征。我们表明，使用径向基函数作为非线性投影器，即使只有部分观测并且不知道控制方程，也能稳健地捕捉复杂的系统非线性。最后，我们表明，当测量稀疏、不完整且带有噪声，甚至控制方程变得不准确时，我们的网络仍然可以产生相当准确的预测，从而为实际湍流系统的无模型预测铺平了道路。
Can revealing one's competitive capabilities to an opponent offer strategic benefits? In this paper, we address this question in the context of General Lotto games, a class of two-player competitive resource allocation models. We consider an asymmetric information setting where the opponent is uncertain about the resource budget of the other player, and holds a prior belief on its value. We assume the other player, called the signaler, is able to send a noisy signal about its budget to the opponent. With its updated belief, the opponent then must decide to invest in costly resources that it will deploy against the signaler's resource budget in a General Lotto game. We derive the subgame perfect equilibrium to this extensive-form game. In particular, we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for which a signaling policy improves the signaler's resulting performance in comparison to the scenario where it does not send any signal. Moreover, we provide the optimal signaling policy when these conditions are met. Notably we find that for some scenarios, the signaler can effectively double its performance.
