论文标题
混合商品的基于批准的投票
Approval-Based Voting with Mixed Goods
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了一种投票方案，其中要投票的资源可能包括不可分割的商品和可划分的商品。这种设置概述了多翼票的良好模型，也概括了最近引入的蛋糕共享模型。在批准投票下，我们提出了来自多翼票的延伸合理代表（EJR）概念的两种变体，这是一种更强的混合商品EJR（EJR-M），而较弱的ejr ejr则称为EJR，最高为1（EJR-1）。我们将三个多翼投票规则扩展到我们的设置-Greedyejr，即平等股份（MES）和比例批准投票（PAV）的方法 - 并表明，尽管所有三个概括都满足EJR-1，但只有第一个提供EJR-M。此外，我们根据EJR-M和EJR-1所隐含的比例程度得出了紧密的界限，并研究了我们提出的规则的比例度。
We consider a voting scenario in which the resource to be voted upon may consist of both indivisible and divisible goods. This setting generalizes both the well-studied model of multiwinner voting and the recently introduced model of cake sharing. Under approval votes, we propose two variants of the extended justified representation (EJR) notion from multiwinner voting, a stronger one called EJR for mixed goods (EJR-M) and a weaker one called EJR up to 1 (EJR-1). We extend three multiwinner voting rules to our setting -- GreedyEJR, the method of equal shares (MES), and proportional approval voting (PAV) -- and show that while all three generalizations satisfy EJR-1, only the first one provides EJR-M. In addition, we derive tight bounds on the proportionality degree implied by EJR-M and EJR-1, and investigate the proportionality degree of our proposed rules.
