论文标题
埃弗里特量子力学的深刻现实主义？
Whence deep realism for Everettian quantum mechanics?
论文作者
论文摘要
科学现实主义的“浅”和“深”版本可以区分如下：浅层现实主义者对信仰我们最好的科学理论的存在感到满意；相比之下，深层现实主义者声称，只有用形而上学的术语描述了这些实体，现实主义才能是合法的。我们认为，这种方法论可以在埃弗里特量子力学上有效地应用，特别是在有关世界存在以及埃弗里特现实主义与量子态度现实主义之间的最新争议上的辩论中。在提出了涉及此类争议的内容之后，我们指出了现实主义者的困境：我们要么没有可用的形而上学工具来回答深层现实主义者的要求，而且在这种情况下，现实主义并不是合理的，或者对形而上学的敷料的要求并不是科学现实主义的强制性，也不是现实主义的深层文章。
`Shallow' and `deep' versions of scientific realism may be distinguished as follows: the shallow realist is satisfied with belief in the existence of the posits of our best scientific theories; by contrast, deep realists claim that realism can be legitimate only if such entities are described in metaphysical terms. We argue that this methodological discussion can be fruitfully applied in Everettian quantum mechanics, specifically on the debate concerning the existence of worlds and the recent dispute between Everettian actualism and quantum modal realism. After presenting what is involved in such dispute, we point to a dilemma for realists: either we don't have the available metaphysical tools to answer the deep realist's demands, and realism is not justified in this case, or such demands of metaphysical dressing are not mandatory for scientific realism, and deep versions of realism are not really required.
