论文标题
部分可观测时空混沌系统的无模型预测
Learning Correlated Stackelberg Equilibrium in General-Sum Multi-Leader-Single-Follower Games
论文作者
论文摘要
储层计算是预测湍流的有力工具，其简单的架构具有处理大型系统的计算效率。然而，其实现通常需要完整的状态向量测量和系统非线性知识。我们使用非线性投影函数将系统测量扩展到高维空间，然后将其输入到储层中以获得预测。我们展示了这种储层计算网络在时空混沌系统上的应用，该系统模拟了湍流的若干特征。我们表明，使用径向基函数作为非线性投影器，即使只有部分观测并且不知道控制方程，也能稳健地捕捉复杂的系统非线性。最后，我们表明，当测量稀疏、不完整且带有噪声，甚至控制方程变得不准确时，我们的网络仍然可以产生相当准确的预测，从而为实际湍流系统的无模型预测铺平了道路。
Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to as Stackelberg game or leader-follower game. In particular, we focus on a Stackelberg game scenario where there are multiple leaders and a single follower, called the Multi-Leader-Single-Follower (MLSF) game. We propose a novel asymmetric equilibrium concept for the MLSF game called Correlated Stackelberg Equilibrium (CSE). We design online learning algorithms that enable the players to interact in a distributed manner, and prove that it can achieve no-external Stackelberg-regret learning. This further translates to the convergence to approximate CSE via a reduction from no-external regret to no-swap regret. At the core of our works, we solve the intricate problem of how to learn equilibrium in leader-follower games with noisy bandit feedback by balancing exploration and exploitation in different learning structures.
