论文标题
气候不确定性，金融摩擦和有效的有效碳税
Climate uncertainty, financial frictions and constrained efficient carbon taxation
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我认为生产经济的简单异质代理模型具有不确定的气候变化，并检查了有效的碳税收限制。如果有无摩擦，完整的金融市场，那么简单的模型可以预测碳税和减排的独特水平。但是，在存在金融摩擦的情况下，如果不立即对减排成本分配在个人之间，则无法定义最佳的减排水平。我提出了一个简单的线性成本分担方案，该方案具有多种理想的规范性能。我使用校准的经济体具有不完整的金融市场和/或市场参与度有限的经济体，以证明不同方案共享减排成本可能会对最佳减排水平产生很大的影响，并且金融摩擦的存在可以使最佳减排增加三分之二的相对于无摩擦金融市场的案例。
In this paper, I consider a simple heterogeneous agents model of a production economy with uncertain climate change and examine constrained efficient carbon taxation. If there are frictionless, complete financial markets, the simple model predicts a unique Pareto-optimal level of carbon taxes and abatement. In the presence of financial frictions, however, the optimal level of abatement cannot be defined without taking a stand on how abatement costs are distributed among individuals. I propose a simple linear cost-sharing scheme that has several desirable normative properties. I use calibrated examples of economies with incomplete financial markets and/or limited market participation to demonstrate that different schemes to share abatement costs can have large effects on optimal abatement levels and that the presence of financial frictions can increase optimal abatement by a factor of three relative to the case of frictionless financial market.
