论文标题
概率攻击图中主动传感器放置的合成
Synthesis of Proactive Sensor Placement In Probabilistic Attack Graphs
论文作者
论文摘要
本文研究了联合移动目标防御（MTD）的部署和针对多阶段网络攻击的欺骗。鉴于配备了不同配置之间随机的MTD系统，我们研究了如何在每种配置中分配有界数的传感器，以在攻击者实现其目标之前优化攻击检测率。具体而言，考虑了两种类型的传感器：攻击者和隐形传感器可观察到的入侵探测器，而攻击者无法观察到。我们提出了一种基于两步优化的方法，用于分配入侵检测器和隐形传感器：首先，假设攻击者将最好地通过入侵检测器对逃避检测作出响应。其次，鉴于第一步计算出最佳响应攻击策略，后卫将分配隐形传感器，以进一步减少攻击者成功的机会。我们使用网络防御示例说明了提出方法的有效性。
This paper studies the deployment of joint moving target defense (MTD) and deception against multi-stage cyberattacks. Given the system equipped with MTD that randomizes between different configurations, we investigate how to allocate a bounded number of sensors in each configuration to optimize the attack detection rate before the attacker achieves its objective. Specifically, two types of sensors are considered: intrusion detectors that are observable by the attacker and stealthy sensors that are not observable to the attacker. We propose a two-step optimization-based approach for allocating intrusion detectors and stealthy sensors: Firstly, the defender allocates intrusion detectors assuming the attacker will best respond to evade detection by intrusion detectors. Secondly, the defender will allocate stealthy sensors, given the best response attack strategy computed in the first step, to further reduce the attacker's chance of success. We illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods using a cyber defense example.
