论文标题
分布式在线广义NASH均衡跟踪，用于制造商能源交易游戏
Distributed Online Generalized Nash Equilibrium Tracking for Prosumer Energy Trading Games
论文作者
论文摘要
随着分布式世代的扩散，分销网络中的传统被动消费者正在演变为“生产者”，这些消费者既可以产生和消耗能量。如果能量盈余和短缺，与主要网格或生产者之间的能源交易是不可避免的。为此，本文调查了点对点（P2P）能源交易市场，该市场被称为广义纳什游戏。我们首先证明了广义纳什均衡（GNE）的存在和唯一性。然后，提出了一种分布式的在线算法，以在随着时间的变化环境中跟踪GNE。事实证明，它的遗憾是由学习时间的均匀功能所束缚的，这表明在线算法在实践中具有可接受的准确性。最后，具有六个微电网的数值结果验证了该算法的性能。
With the proliferation of distributed generations, traditional passive consumers in distribution networks are evolving into "prosumers", which can both produce and consume energy. Energy trading with the main grid or between prosumers is inevitable if the energy surplus and shortage exist. To this end, this paper investigates the peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading market, which is formulated as a generalized Nash game. We first prove the existence and uniqueness of the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). Then, an distributed online algorithm is proposed to track the GNE in the time-varying environment. Its regret is proved to be bounded by a sublinear function of learning time, which indicates that the online algorithm has an acceptable accuracy in practice. Finally, numerical results with six microgrids validate the performance of the algorithm.
