论文标题
硬件特洛伊木马威胁在现代2.5d chiplet系统中缓存连贯性
Hardware Trojan Threats to Cache Coherence in Modern 2.5D Chiplet Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
随着行业发展基于奇普的设计，硬件木马的插入对这些系统的安全构成了重大威胁。这些系统在很大程度上依赖于缓存连贯性进行相干数据通信，从而使连贯性成为有吸引力的目标。至关重要的是，与先前的工作不同，它仅着眼于恶意数据包修改，而利用连贯性的特洛伊木马攻击可以修改内存中的数据，而这些数据从未触及过，并且不由包含特洛伊木马的chiplet拥有。此外，特洛伊木马甚至不必在受害者和记忆控制器之间进行身体上的身体来攻击受害者的记忆交易。在这里，我们探讨了基于chiplet的系统中可能的基本攻击向量，并提供了一个示例，可以直接修改记忆中的受害者数据的示例。这项工作旨在强调开发可以保护和保护连贯方案免受这些攻击形式的机制。
As industry moves toward chiplet-based designs, the insertion of hardware Trojans poses a significant threat to the security of these systems. These systems rely heavily on cache coherence for coherent data communication, making coherence an attractive target. Critically, unlike prior work, which focuses only on malicious packet modifications, a Trojan attack that exploits coherence can modify data in memory that was never touched and is not owned by the chiplet which contains the Trojan. Further, the Trojan need not even be physically between the victim and the memory controller to attack the victim's memory transactions. Here, we explore the fundamental attack vectors possible in chiplet-based systems and provide an example Trojan implementation capable of directly modifying victim data in memory. This work aims to highlight the need for developing mechanisms that can protect and secure the coherence scheme from these forms of attacks.
