论文标题
关于理性法学：贝叶斯确认理论的问题
On Rational Jurisprudence: A Problem in Bayesian Confirmation Theory
论文作者
论文摘要
本文关注的是认知问题的问题，即通过陪审员在美国式的刑事审判过程中听到的证词证实了一个假设 - 被告的内gui。在其中，我试图解决法律界的两个股关系之间的争议，即贝叶斯理性方法是否与诸如无罪推定之类的法学原则不兼容。为此，我证明了一个代表理论，该定理表明，只要陪审员不会判定被告没有听到证词（无罪的假设），但会在听到某些证词（愿意被定罪的意愿）时被定罪，那么这位陪审员的性格就会代表被告的性格，因为被告人可以宣布贝叶斯·恩列舍（Bayesian Thareshold Threshold）的陪审员的陪审员。该结果表明，贝叶斯阈值陪审员的相关概念不足以使这一辩论成为实质性的辩论。
This paper is concerned with the epistemic question of confirming a hypothesis -- the guilt of a defendant -- by way of testimony heard by a juror over the course of an American-style criminal trial. In it, I attempt to settle a dispute between two strands of the legal community over the issue of whether the methods of Bayesian rationality are incompatible with jurisprudential principles such as the Presumption of Innocence. To this end, I prove a representation theorem that shows that so long as a juror would not convict the defendant having heard no testimony (the Presumption of Innocence) but would convict upon hearing some collection of testimony (Willingness to Convict), then this juror's disposition to convict the defendant is representable as the disposition of a Bayesian threshold juror in Posner's sense. This result indicates that relevant notion of a Bayesian threshold juror is insufficiently specified to render this debate a substantive one.
