论文标题
模棱两可的廉价谈话
Ambiguous Cheap Talk
论文作者
论文摘要
本文探讨了歧义如何影响沟通。我们考虑了一种廉价的聊天模型，其中接收器根据乘数偏好产生的最差预期收益来评估发件人的消息。我们表征了接收者的最佳策略，并表明接收者的后验作用与他的前动作一致。我们发现，在某些情况下，歧义通过将接收器的最佳动作向上移动来改善沟通，而这些情况并不罕见。
This paper explores how ambiguity affects communication. We consider a cheap talk model in which the receiver evaluates the sender's message with respect to its worst-case expected payoff generated by multiplier preferences. We characterize the receiver's optimal strategy and show that the receiver's posterior action is consistent with his ex-ante action. We find that in some situations, ambiguity improves communication by shifting the receiver's optimal action upwards, and these situations are not rare.
