论文标题
关于依赖，偏好和联盟权力的推理
Reasoning about Dependence, Preference and Coalitional Power
论文作者
论文摘要
本文介绍了偏爱和功能依赖性（LPFD）及其混合扩展（HLPFD）的逻辑，它们的声音和强烈完整的公理化均提供。还证明了LPFD的可决定性。探索了LPFD和HLPFD在战略和联盟形式中建模合作游戏中的应用。所得的框架为NASH平衡，帕累托最优性和核心提供了统一的视图。这些游戏理论与集体代理讨论的哲学相关性是明确的。还揭示了一些与其他逻辑的关键连接，例如，联盟逻辑，逻辑功能依赖性和Ceteris Paribus偏好的逻辑。
This paper presents a logic of preference and functional dependence (LPFD) and its hybrid extension (HLPFD), both of whose sound and strongly complete axiomatization are provided. The decidability of LPFD is also proved. The application of LPFD and HLPFD to modelling cooperative games in strategic and coalitional forms is explored. The resulted framework provides a unified view on Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality and the core. The philosophical relevance of these game-theoretical notions to discussions of collective agency is made explicit. Some key connections with other logics are also revealed, for example, the coalition logic, the logic functional dependence and the logic of ceteris paribus preference.
