论文标题
Bimatrix游戏的生态进化动态
Eco-Evolutionary Dynamics of Bimatrix Games
论文作者
论文摘要
策略与环境之间的反馈在社会生态，进化生态甚至心理经济系统中很常见。利用共同资源始终是社区成员的困境，例如公地的悲剧。在这里，我们考虑使用反馈不断发展的游戏的复制器动力学，其中收益在两个不同的矩阵之间切换。尽管每个收益矩阵本身都代表了合作者和叛逃者无法稳定共存的环境，但我们表明，可以设计适当的切换控制法律并实现持续的策略丰度振荡。该结果应有助于指导微生物实验中人口状态控制的广泛问题，并通过生态进化反馈回路引起其他社会问题。
Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the commons. Here we consider replicator dynamics with feedback-evolving games, where the payoffs switch between two different matrices. Although each payoff matrix on its own represents an environment where cooperators and defectors can't coexist stably, we show that it's possible to design appropriate switching control laws and achieve persistent oscillations of strategy abundance. This result should help guide the widespread problem of population state control in microbial experiments and other social problems with eco-evolutionary feedback loops.
