论文标题
多维世界中的最佳委派
Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了一个代表团的模型，其中主管采取多维行动，而代理具有有关世界多维状态的私人信息。主体可以设计任何直接机制，包括随机机制。我们为任意机制提供必要的条件，以最大程度地提高委托人的预期回报。我们还讨论了简单的条件，以确保某些凸代表团集是最佳的。我们分析的一个关键步骤表明，当且仅当其诱导的间接实用程序为凸并且位于代理商的第一好的收益下时，一种机制是兼容的。
We study a model of delegation in which a principal takes a multidimensional action and an agent has private information about a multidimensional state of the world. The principal can design any direct mechanism, including stochastic ones. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for an arbitrary mechanism to maximize the principal's expected payoff. We also discuss simple conditions which ensure that some convex delegation set is optimal. A key step of our analysis shows that a mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if its induced indirect utility is convex and lies below the agent's first-best payoff.
