论文标题
通过HTTP/2的镜头和公共数据集对HTTP/3安全性进行动手凝视
A hands-on gaze on HTTP/3 security through the lens of HTTP/2 and a public dataset
论文作者
论文摘要
在2021年5月的QUIC协议批准后,超文本转移协议的第三个主要版本,即HTTP/3,大约在一年后在RFC 9114中发布。鉴于这些结果的进步,当前的工作渴望提供以下问题的全面覆盖,这对我们的知识而言是在文献中获得的,或者在文献中都没有引起注意。首先,我们对针对HTTP/2的攻击进行了完整的审查,并详细介绍了是否以及以何种方式迁移到HTTP/3。其次,通过创建包括目前最受欢迎的HTTP/3启用服务器的测试台,我们检查了四重奏攻击的有效性,要么直接源于HTTP/2相关文献,要么是全新的。这种审查导致至少由MITER分配了一个CVE ID。同样重要的是,通过在设备测试台上利用现实的,丰富的,我们编制了一个庞大的标签,包含对HTTP和QUIC服务的十种攻击的痕迹。还包括主要通过机器学习技术对数据集进行初步评估。鉴于30 GB数据集以PCAP和CSV格式提供,因此即将进行的研究可以轻松地利用任何功能,包括特定的网络拓扑和配置。
Following QUIC protocol ratification on May 2021, the third major version of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol, namely HTTP/3, was published around one year later in RFC 9114. In light of these consequential advancements, the current work aspires to provide a full-blown coverage of the following issues, which to our knowledge have received feeble or no attention in the literature so far. First, we provide a complete review of attacks against HTTP/2, and elaborate on if and in which way they can be migrated to HTTP/3. Second, through the creation of a testbed comprising the at present six most popular HTTP/3-enabled servers, we examine the effectiveness of a quartet of attacks, either stemming directly from the HTTP/2 relevant literature or being entirely new. This scrutiny led to the assignment of at least one CVE ID with a critical base score by MITRE. No less important, by capitalizing on a realistic, abundant in devices testbed, we compiled a voluminous, labeled corpus containing traces of ten diverse attacks against HTTP and QUIC services. An initial evaluation of the dataset mainly by means of machine learning techniques is included as well. Given that the 30 GB dataset is made available in both pcap and CSV formats, forthcoming research can easily take advantage of any subset of features, contingent upon the specific network topology and configuration.