论文标题
潘多拉的投票箱：直接民主的选举政治
Pandora's Ballot Box: Electoral Politics of Direct Democracy
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究寻求办公室寻求政党如何利用直接民主来塑造选举。具有强大选举基础的政党可以通过使用具有约束力的全民公决来解决将其核心支持者分开的问题。但是，当全民公决没有约束力时，选民处境不利的一方可能会发起全民投票，以提升新问题，以划分其更强大的对手的支持者。我们确定直接民主在政策成果和选民偏好之间的一致性的条件，但也表明，这可能会导致对直接民主的问题和不属于民主的问题，这既可能导致更大的错位。
We study how office-seeking parties use direct democracy to shape elections. A party with a strong electoral base can benefit from using a binding referendum to resolve issues that divide its core supporters. When referendums do not bind, however, an electorally disadvantaged party may initiate a referendum to elevate new issues in order to divide the supporters of its stronger opponent. We identify conditions under which direct democracy improves congruence between policy outcomes and voter preferences, but also show that it can lead to greater misalignment both on issues subject to direct democracy and those that are not.
