论文标题
仅填充防御增加了TOR的延迟
Padding-only defenses add delay in Tor
论文作者
论文摘要
网站指纹识别是一种使用加密下载的尺寸和计时特征来识别目标网站的攻击。由于这可能会破坏诸如TOR之类的匿名网络的隐私目标，因此在文献中提出了许多用于抵抗这种攻击的算法。这些算法通常包括将虚拟“填充”数据包注入的某种组合，并延迟了实际数据包以破坏时序模式。出于可用性原因，Tor旨在提供低潜伏期；因此，许多作者专注于仅填充防御，因为他们是“零延迟”。我们通过影子模拟证明，通过增加队列长度，仅填充防御在网络部署时会增加延迟，因此不应将其视为“零延迟”。我们进一步认为，还应使用网络范围的部署模拟对未来的防御措施进行评估
Website fingerprinting is an attack that uses size and timing characteristics of encrypted downloads to identify targeted websites. Since this can defeat the privacy goals of anonymity networks such as Tor, many algorithms to defend against this attack in Tor have been proposed in the literature. These algorithms typically consist of some combination of the injection of dummy "padding" packets with the delay of actual packets to disrupt timing patterns. For usability reasons, Tor is intended to provide low latency; as such, many authors focus on padding-only defenses in the belief that they are "zero-delay." We demonstrate through Shadow simulations that by increasing queue lengths, padding-only defenses add delay when deployed network-wide, so they should not be considered "zero-delay." We further argue that future defenses should also be evaluated using network-wide deployment simulations
