论文标题
计算预算受限的产品混合拍卖中的候选价格
Computing Candidate Prices in Budget-Constrained Product-Mix Auctions
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了针对预算限制的产品混合拍卖版本计算最佳价格的问题。与``标准'产品混合拍卖'相反，目标是最大化收入而不是社会福利。我们证明了Paul Klemperer和Dotecon提出的算法的正确性，该算法在较小的市场中足够有效。
We study the problem of computing optimal prices for a version of the Product-Mix auction with budget constraints. In contrast to the ``standard'' Product-Mix auction, the objective is to maximize revenue instead of social welfare. We prove correctness of an algorithm proposed by Paul Klemperer and DotEcon which is sufficiently efficient in smaller markets.
