论文标题
宽容和真理程度
Tolerance and degrees of truth
论文作者
论文摘要
本文探讨了两种逻辑方法的模糊性方法：一方面，由史密斯（2008）捍卫的模糊方法，另一方面是Cobreros，Egrer，Egrel，Ripley和Van Rooij（2012）捍卫的严格耐受性方法。尽管前者的方法使用连续数量的许多值，而后者则隐含了四个值，但我们表明，这两种方法都可以在一个共同的三值框架下包含。特别是，我们捍卫了史密斯连续体的说法，不需要许多价值来解决史密斯所说的“震动问题”，我们表明他们也不需要他对逻辑后果的描述。不仅三个值足以满足史密斯的中心义工，而且还使我们能够以对象语言的宽容原则的形式内部化史密斯的亲密原则。我们认为，减少对在模糊语言的适当理论中对多元价值的正当理由至关重要。
This paper explores the relations between two logical approaches to vagueness: on the one hand the fuzzy approach defended by Smith (2008), and on the other the strict-tolerant approach defended by Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij (2012). Although the former approach uses continuum many values and the latter implicitly four, we show that both approaches can be subsumed under a common three-valued framework. In particular, we defend the claim that Smith's continuum many values are not needed to solve what Smith calls `the jolt problem', and we show that they are not needed for his account of logical consequence either. Not only are three values enough to satisfy Smith's central desiderata, but they also allow us to internalize Smith's closeness principle in the form of a tolerance principle at the object-language. The reduction, we argue, matters for the justification of many-valuedness in an adequate theory of vague language.
