论文标题
在付款方式下的消费者行为的游戏理论模型
A Game-theoretic Model of the Consumer Behavior Under Pay-What-You-Want Pricing Strategy
论文作者
论文摘要
在公司面临技术，消费者趋势和商业环境的快速变化的数字时代，对于响应破坏性创新而不断修改业务模型。商业实践创新的支柱是采用新颖的定价方案，例如付费款项（PWYW）。在本文中，我们采用了游戏理论和行为经济学来对消费者的行为进行模型，以响应PWYW定价策略，在这种策略中，消费者和供应商之间存在信息不对称。为了最大程度地减少信息不对称性，我们将供应商的成本和消费者的参考价格纳入了两个参数，可能会影响消费者的付款决定。我们的模型表明，消费者的行为取决于可用信息。结果，当提供外部参考点时，消费者倾向于支付更高的款项来遵循社会群或尊重她的自我形象。但是，当出于公平性而放弃购买时，外部参考价格也可以减少她的需求，因为她愿意支付的金额少于她所承认的是对供应商的不可收复的成本。
In a digital age where companies face rapid changes in technology, consumer trends, and business environments, there is a critical need for continual revision of the business model in response to disruptive innovation. A pillar of innovation in business practices is the adoption of novel pricing schemes, such as Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW). In this paper, we employed game theory and behavioral economics to model consumers' behavior in response to a PWYW pricing strategy where there is an information asymmetry between the consumer and supplier. In an effort to minimize the information asymmetry, we incorporated the supplier's cost and the consumer's reference prices as two parameters that might influence the consumer's payment decision. Our model shows that consumers' behavior varies depending on the available information. As a result, when an external reference point is provided, the consumer tends to pay higher amounts to follow the social herd or respect her self-image. However, the external reference price can also decrease her demand when, in the interest of fairness, she forgoes the purchase because the amount she is willing to pay is less that what she recognizes to be an unrecoverable cost to the supplier.
