论文标题
西翼内部：游说作为一场比赛
Inside the West Wing: Lobbying as a contest
论文作者
论文摘要
当政府做出许多不同的政策决定时，可以将游说视为政府与许多不同特殊利益集团之间的竞赛。政府与利益集团与自己的政治资本进行游说。在这个世界上，我们发现政府希望“卖出保护” - 为某些利益集团提供良好的治疗以换取捐款。它这样做是为了建立自己的政治资本“战争之箱”，从而提高了与其他利益集团战斗的地位。这样做，直到它可以肯定地赢得所有剩余的比赛。这与现有的模型相反，这些模型通常将游说是由信息或代理问题驱动的。
When a government makes many different policy decisions, lobbying can be viewed as a contest between the government and many different special interest groups. The government fights lobbying by interest groups with its own political capital. In this world, we find that a government wants to `sell protection' -- give favourable treatment in exchange for contributions -- to certain interest groups. It does this in order to build its own `war chest' of political capital, which improves its position in fights with other interest groups. And it does so until it wins all remaining contests with certainty. This stands in contrast to existing models that often view lobbying as driven by information or agency problems.
