论文标题
无限 - 摩恩综合游戏中退缩摩恩控制控制的框架
A framework for receding-horizon control in infinite-horizon aggregative games
论文作者
论文摘要
假设玩家受到异质周期性的约束，则提出了一个新颖的建模框架，以在无限时间的地平线上分析聚合游戏。提出了一个新的汇总平衡概念，并在退化的地平线范式下分析了代理的战略行为。随着时间的推移，参与者预测和实施的策略的演变是通过离散时间的多价动力系统建模的。通过考虑Lyapunov稳定性概念，并应用限制和不变性结果，以使所需条件得出必要的条件，以收敛回收的地平线映射到总体游戏的周期性平衡。对于任何（可行的）初始条件，可以实现此结果，从而确保所提出的控制框架对玩家数量和参数的实时变化的隐式适应性。讨论了建议的控制策略的设计和实施，并提供了用于数据路由的分布式控制的示例，以评估其在模拟中的性能。
A novel modelling framework is proposed for the analysis of aggregative games on an infinite-time horizon, assuming that players are subject to heterogeneous periodic constraints. A new aggregative equilibrium notion is presented and the strategic behaviour of the agents is analysed under a receding horizon paradigm. The evolution of the strategies predicted and implemented by the players over time is modelled through a discrete-time multi-valued dynamical system. By considering Lyapunov stability notions and applying limit and invariance results for set-valued correspondences, necessary conditions are derived for convergence of a receding horizon map to a periodic equilibrium of the aggregative game. This result is achieved for any (feasible) initial condition, thus ensuring implicit adaptivity of the proposed control framework to real-time variations in the number and parameters of players. Design and implementation of the proposed control strategy are discussed and an example of distributed control for data routing is presented, evaluating its performance in simulation.
