论文标题
差的代理和补贴：通过CCM模型进行调查
A poor agent and subsidy: an investigation through CCM model
论文作者
论文摘要
在这项工作中，研究了某些修改的CCM类型动力学财富交换模型中代理的动力学。这些代理人有资格获得补贴，这在任何实际经济中都可以看到。如果两种相互作用的代理的财富都低于阈值线，则禁止相互作用。可以在抽象的损失空间（GLS）中构思这样的代理商的步行路程，并在宏观上与懒惰的步行相提并论。从GLS步行的角度从重复获得补贴的情况下，检查了一次将补贴的效果。可以看出，如果给予补贴一次，则步行会有更积极的漂移。研究了相关性和其他有趣的数量。
In this work, the dynamics of agents below a \textit{threshold line} in some modified CCM type kinetic wealth exchange models are studied. These agents are eligible for subsidy as can be seen in any real economy. An interaction is prohibited if both of the interacting agents' wealth fall below the threshold line. A walk for such agents can be conceived in the abstract Gain-Loss Space(GLS) and is macroscopically compared to a lazy walk. The effect of giving subsidy once to such agents is checked over giving repeated subsidy from the point of view of the walk in GLS. It is seen that the walk has more positive drift if the subsidy is given once. The correlations and other interesting quantities are studied.
