论文标题
最佳的私人收益操纵，反对广泛的游戏中的承诺
Optimal Private Payoff Manipulation against Commitment in Extensive-form Games
论文作者
论文摘要
要利用战略承诺，这是玩游戏的有用策略，领导者必须学习有关追随者的回报功能的足够信息。但是，这使追随者有机会提供虚假信息并影响最终的游戏结果。通过对学习领导者的仔细的回报功能，与他的真实行为相比，追随者可能会引起更多使他受益的结果。 我们通过广泛形式的游戏中这种战略行为研究追随者的最佳操纵。追随者的不同态度被考虑在内。乐观的追随者在所有游戏成果中最大限度地发挥了他的真实用途，这些效用可以由某些回报功能引起。悲观的追随者只考虑了导致独特游戏结果的错误报告的回报功能。对于本文中考虑的所有设置，我们表征了可以成功引起的所有可能的游戏成果。我们证明，追随者可以找到误会其私人收益信息的最佳方式是多项式时间的。我们的工作完全解决了这一追随者在广泛形式的游戏树上的最佳操纵问题。
To take advantage of strategy commitment, a useful tactic of playing games, a leader must learn enough information about the follower's payoff function. However, this leaves the follower a chance to provide fake information and influence the final game outcome. Through a carefully contrived payoff function misreported to the learning leader, the follower may induce an outcome that benefits him more, compared to the ones when he truthfully behaves. We study the follower's optimal manipulation via such strategic behaviors in extensive-form games. Followers' different attitudes are taken into account. An optimistic follower maximizes his true utility among all game outcomes that can be induced by some payoff function. A pessimistic follower only considers misreporting payoff functions that induce a unique game outcome. For all the settings considered in this paper, we characterize all the possible game outcomes that can be induced successfully. We show that it is polynomial-time tractable for the follower to find the optimal way of misreporting his private payoff information. Our work completely resolves this follower's optimal manipulation problem on an extensive-form game tree.
