论文标题
将您的交易保持在短牵引牵引力上
Keep Your Transactions On Short Leashes
论文作者
论文摘要
对手安装远程攻击（LRAS）的目标是欺骗潜在的受害者使用和依靠侧链，即交易的虚假替代历史，并提出最终损害自己或他人的交易。先前关于区块链系统LRA的研究工作已在高水平上使用了两种方法之一。他们要么尝试（1）防止伪造的侧链的创建，要么（2）使该侧链与主要共识链区分开。 在本文中，我们采用了另一种方法。我们从共识链中的侧链无法区分的性（对于受害者的受害者）中，并认为潜在的受害者将被愚弄。取而代之的是，我们通过减少伤害来保护受害者，将“短牵引”用于交易。皮带可防止交易在错误的上下文中使用。 本文的主要贡献是对牵引的设计和分析。次要贡献是在条形容量容量的背景下仔细阐明LRA威胁模型，并使用它来分析相关工作以确定其局限性。
The adversary's goal in mounting Long Range Attacks (LRAs) is to fool potential victims into using and relying on a side chain, i.e., a false, alternate history of transactions, and into proposing transactions that end up harming themselves or others. Previous research work on LRAs on blockchain systems have used, at a high level, one of two approaches. They either try to (1) prevent the creation of a bogus side chain or (2) make it possible to distinguish such a side chain from the main consensus chain. In this paper, we take a different approach. We start with the indistinguishability of side chains from the consensus chain -- for the eclipsed victim -- as a given and assume the potential victim will be fooled. Instead, we protect the victim via harm reduction applying "short leashes" to transactions. The leashes prevent transactions from being used in the wrong context. The primary contribution of this paper is the design and analysis of leashes. A secondary contribution is the careful explication of the LRA threat model in the context of BAR fault tolerance, and using it to analyze related work to identify their limitations.
