论文标题
更好的工作证明激励措施
Better Incentives for Proof-of-Work
论文作者
论文摘要
这项工作提出了一种新颖的工作证明区块链激励方案，以至于遵循该协议的外源动机，保证是矿工的最佳策略。我们的区块链采用了定向的无环图的形式，从而对吞吐量和速度进行了改进。 更重要的是，对于我们的区块链发挥作用，矿工不可预见，为了系统的可操作性，矿工符合某些预设方案。取而代之的是，如果矿工自私地采取行动，试图获得最大可能的奖励，而无需考虑区块链的整体健康，则我们的系统起作用。
This work proposes a novel proof-of-work blockchain incentive scheme such that, barring exogenous motivations, following the protocol is guaranteed to be the optimal strategy for miners. Our blockchain takes the form of a directed acyclic graph, resulting in improvements with respect to throughput and speed. More importantly, for our blockchain to function, it is not expected that the miners conform to some presupposed protocol in the interest of the system's operability. Instead, our system works if miners act selfishly, trying to get the maximum possible rewards, with no consideration for the overall health of the blockchain.
