论文标题
重复游戏中存在零确定策略的必要条件
Necessary and Sufficient Condition for the Existence of Zero-Determinant Strategies in Repeated Games
论文作者
论文摘要
零确定的策略是重复游戏中的一类内存策略，它们可以单方面地在收益之间实施线性关系。长期以来，尚不清楚零确定策略的哪些阶段游戏。我们为存在零确定的策略提供了必要和充分的条件。该条件可以解释为存在两个不同动作的存在，它们单方面调整了收益的线性组合的总价值。还提供了零确定策略的舞台游戏类别与其他类别的舞台游戏之间的关系。
Zero-determinant strategies are a class of memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relationships between payoffs. It has long been unclear for what stage games zero-determinant strategies exist. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of zero-determinant strategies. This condition can be interpreted as the existence of two different actions which unilaterally adjust the total value of a linear combination of payoffs. A relation between the class of stage games where zero-determinant strategies exist and other class of stage games is also provided.
