论文标题
理想排名：一种新方法，用于排名竞争过程
Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process
论文作者
论文摘要
我们认为将替代方案的个人偏好汇总为社会排名的问题。与诸如Arrow的不可能定理相比，我们考虑的问题的关键特征以及允许我们获得积极结果的问题是，排名的替代方案是竞争过程的结果。例子包括大学或学术期刊的排名。我们排名方法的基础是，代理排名高于他们接受的替代方案（因此被拒绝）在总排名中也应更高。我们介绍公理以形式化这个想法，并将所有满足我们公理的排名称为理想的排名。我们表明，随着市场的发展，任何理想的排名都与质量的真正基本排名相吻合。最后，我们为构建理想排名提供了一种算法，并表明该算法的结果是满足我们公理的大学的独特排名。
We consider the problem of aggregating individual preferences over alternatives into a social ranking. A key feature of the problems that we consider - and the one that allows us to obtain positive results, in contrast to negative results such as Arrow's Impossibililty Theorem - is that the alternatives to be ranked are outcomes of a competitive process. Examples include rankings of colleges or academic journals. The foundation of our ranking method is that alternatives that agents rank higher than the one they receive (and thus have been rejected by) should also be ranked higher in the aggregate ranking. We introduce axioms to formalize this idea, and call any ranking that satisfies our axioms a desirable ranking. We show that as the market grows large, any desirable ranking coincides with the true underlying ranking of colleges by quality. Last, we provide an algorithm for constructing desirable rankings, and show that the outcome of this algorithm is the unique ranking of the colleges that satisfy our axioms.
