论文标题
基于DNS的浏览器内加密助理检测
DNS based In-Browser Cryptojacking Detection
论文作者
论文摘要
域名(DNS)的元数据方面使我们能够对DNS进行行为研究,并检测DN是否参与了浏览器内的加密夹克。因此,我们有动力研究涉及加密夹的DN的不同时间和行为方面。我们使用诸如查询频率和查询爆发之类的时间功能以及基于图的特征,例如学位和直径,以及基于字符串的非颞型特征,以检测DNS是否可疑是否参与了浏览器内的加密夹具。然后,我们使用它们来训练机器学习(ML)算法,例如2小时数据集和完成数据集。我们的结果表明,决策板分类器表现出色,在加密夹的DN上召回了59.5%的召回,而对于无监督的学习,k = 2的k均值表现最好。对特征的相似性分析表明,加密夹克DNS和其他已知的恶意DNS之间的差异很小。它还揭示了需要改进最先进方法集以提高其在检测浏览器内的加密夹具的准确性的必要性。随着进一步的分析,我们的基于签名的分析确定,印度政府网站在2021年10月至12月期间没有参与加密劫持。但是,根据资源利用率,我们确定了10个具有不同属性的DNS。
The metadata aspect of Domain Names (DNs) enables us to perform a behavioral study of DNs and detect if a DN is involved in in-browser cryptojacking. Thus, we are motivated to study different temporal and behavioral aspects of DNs involved in cryptojacking. We use temporal features such as query frequency and query burst along with graph-based features such as degree and diameter, and non-temporal features such as the string-based to detect if a DNs is suspect to be involved in the in-browser cryptojacking. Then, we use them to train the Machine Learning (ML) algorithms over different temporal granularities such as 2 hours datasets and complete dataset. Our results show DecisionTrees classifier performs the best with 59.5% Recall on cryptojacked DN, while for unsupervised learning, K-Means with K=2 perform the best. Similarity analysis of the features reveals a minimal divergence between the cryptojacking DNs and other already known malicious DNs. It also reveals the need for improvements in the feature set of state-of-the-art methods to improve their accuracy in detecting in-browser cryptojacking. As added analysis, our signature-based analysis identifies that none-of-the Indian Government websites were involved in cryptojacking during October-December 2021. However, based on the resource utilization, we identify 10 DNs with different properties than others.