论文标题
说服力的比较静态
The comparative statics of persuasion
论文作者
论文摘要
在说服模型中，除了一些特殊情况外，比较静态是一个悬而未决的问题。我们回答，描述发件人的临时收益的哪些变化使她最佳地选择了一个更有信息的信号。我们的第一个定理标识了“增加凸度”的粗略概念，我们表明的是发件人临时收益的转变，使她最佳地选择了无需提供信息的信号。为了加强这一结论以“更有信息”需要进一步的假设：我们的第二个定理确定了发件人的临时收益的必要条件，这严格概括了在文献中通常强加的convex-conconcave（'s'）形状。我们确定条件下，发件人和接收器之间的利益一致性提高了比较静态，并研究了许多应用。
In the persuasion model, apart from a few special cases, comparative statics has been an open question. We answer it, delineating which shifts of the sender's interim payoff lead her optimally to choose a more informative signal. Our first theorem identifies a coarse notion of 'increased convexity' that we show characterises those shifts of the sender's interim payoff that lead her optimally to choose no less informative signals. To strengthen this conclusion to 'more informative' requires further assumptions: our second theorem identifies the necessary and sufficient condition on the sender's interim payoff, which strictly generalises the convex-concave ('S') shape commonly imposed in the literature. We identify conditions under which increased alignment of interests between sender and receiver leads to comparative statics, and study a number of applications.
