论文标题
等级贝叶斯说服：副总统的重要性
Hierarchical Bayesian Persuasion: Importance of Vice Presidents
论文作者
论文摘要
我们在层次结构环境中研究战略信息传输，其中信息通过一系列代理传输到决策者，该决策者的行动对每个代理都很重要。每当代理人只能通过一系列中介机构与决策者交流，例如，一家公司的工作人员和首席执行官，或者是指挥连锁店的官员和政府总统的官员，就会出现这种情况。每个代理商都可以决定隐藏部分或她收到的所有信息。证明我们可以专注于简单的平衡，唯一隐藏信息的玩家是第一个信息，我们提供了对平衡结果的可拖动递归表征，并表明它效率低下。有趣的是，在二进制行动案例中，无论中间人的数量如何，都有一些关键的人确定传达给决策者的信息量。在这种情况下，我们的结果强调了选择关键副总统来最大化首席执行官或总统的回报的重要性。
We study strategic information transmission in a hierarchical setting where information gets transmitted through a chain of agents up to a decision maker whose action is of importance to every agent. This situation could arise whenever an agent can communicate to the decision maker only through a chain of intermediaries, for example, an entry-level worker and the CEO in a firm, or an official in the bottom of the chain of command and the president in a government. Each agent can decide to conceal part or all the information she receives. Proving we can focus on simple equilibria, where the only player who conceals information is the first one, we provide a tractable recursive characterization of the equilibrium outcome, and show that it could be inefficient. Interestingly, in the binary-action case, regardless of the number of intermediaries, there are a few pivotal ones who determine the amount of information communicated to the decision maker. In this case, our results underscore the importance of choosing a pivotal vice president for maximizing the payoff of the CEO or president.
