论文标题
比较批准投票和Borda的操作性
Comparing the Manipulability of Approval Voting and Borda
论文作者
论文摘要
Gibbard-Satterthwaite定理确定，没有非平凡的投票规则是防策略的，但这并不意味着所有投票规则同样容易受到战略操纵的影响。在过去的五十年中，已经提出了许多方法，以比较了操纵的可能性，操纵的可能性，可以找到这种操纵的复杂性以及其他人的复杂性。在匹配的紧密相关领域，Pathak和Sonmez基于逐案案例比较可操作的轮廓的可操作性概念。这种方法的优点是它独立于基础统计文化或代理的计算能力，并且在匹配文献中已证明富有成果。在本文中，我们将Pathak和Sonmez的概念扩展到投票，研究$ k $批准的家庭和截断的Borda评分规则。我们发现，除了一个例外，该概念不允许对这些规则的可操作性有意义的顺序。
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem established that no non-trivial voting rule is strategy-proof, but that does not mean that all voting rules are equally susceptible to strategic manipulation. Over the past fifty years numerous approaches have been proposed to compare the manipulability of voting rules in terms of the probability of manipulation, the domains on which manipulation is possible, the complexity of finding such a manipulation, and others. In the closely related field of matching, Pathak and Sonmez pioneered a notion of manipulability based on case-by-case comparison of manipulable profiles. The advantage of this approach is that it is independent of the underlying statistical culture or the computational power of the agents, and it has proven fruitful in the matching literature. In this paper, we extend the notion of Pathak and Sonmez to voting, studying the families of $k$-approval and truncated Borda scoring rules. We find that, with one exception, the notion does not allow for a meaningful ordering of the manipulability of these rules.
