论文标题
使用内核方法验证安全关键控制策略
Verification of safety critical control policies using kernel methods
论文作者
论文摘要
汉密尔顿 - 雅各比（Hamilton-Jacobi）的可及性控制方法已经进行了充分的研究，但是得出的安全保证依赖于数值计算的准确性。因此，要理解并说明由于基本动力学和环境以及诱导的数值错误而导致的任何不准确性至关重要。为此，我们提出了一个框架，用于建模使用高斯过程中汉密尔顿 - 雅各比可达性固有的价值函数的误差。派生的安全控制器可与任意控制器结合使用，以提供安全的混合控制法。然后，高斯工艺的边际可能性提供了一个置信度度量，用于确定最小限制控制器和安全控制器之间的开关。我们在经典的追捕示例中测试了提出方法的预测和校正能力。
Hamilton-Jacobi reachability methods for safety-critical control have been well studied, but the safety guarantees derived rely on the accuracy of the numerical computation. Thus, it is crucial to understand and account for any inaccuracies that occur due to uncertainty in the underlying dynamics and environment as well as the induced numerical errors. To this end, we propose a framework for modeling the error of the value function inherent in Hamilton-Jacobi reachability using a Gaussian process. The derived safety controller can be used in conjuncture with arbitrary controllers to provide a safe hybrid control law. The marginal likelihood of the Gaussian process then provides a confidence metric used to determine switches between a least restrictive controller and a safety controller. We test both the prediction as well as the correction capabilities of the presented method in a classical pursuit-evasion example.
