论文标题
使用游戏理论和区块链应用程序（扩展版本）对两党交换协议进行正式成本公平性
Formalizing Cost Fairness for Two-Party Exchange Protocols using Game Theory and Applications to Blockchain (Extended Version)
论文作者
论文摘要
现有的公平交换协议通常在评估其公平性时忽略考虑成本的考虑。但是，在不可忽略的交易成本的环境中，例如，公共区块链，高或意外的交易成本可能是广泛采用业务应用中公平交换协议的障碍。例如，从2021-12-17开始，以太坊区块链上的Fairswap协议的初始化要求卖方支付大约费用。每次交易所349.20美元。我们通过定义成本公平来解决这个问题，该问题可用于评估两党交换协议，包括隐含交易成本。我们表明，在一个不可忽略的交易成本的环境中，一方必须初始化交换协议，而另一方可以在任何时候离开交换，而成本公平就无法实现。
Existing fair exchange protocols usually neglect consideration of cost when assessing their fairness. However, in an environment with non-negligible transaction cost, e.g., public blockchains, high or unexpected transaction cost might be an obstacle for wide-spread adoption of fair exchange protocols in business applications. For example, as of 2021-12-17, the initialization of the FairSwap protocol on the Ethereum blockchain requires the selling party to pay a fee of approx. 349.20 USD per exchange. We address this issue by defining cost fairness, which can be used to assess two-party exchange protocols including implied transaction cost. We show that in an environment with non-negligible transaction cost where one party has to initialize the exchange protocol and the other party can leave the exchange at any time cost fairness cannot be achieved.
