论文标题
学校选择问题中的偏好学习
Preference Learning in School Choice Problems
论文作者
论文摘要
在学校选择中，学生根据对特定学校的适用性的期望做出决定，并且收集有关学校信息的决定受到该机制确定的验收赔率的影响。我们研究了学校选择模型，学生可以通过产生成本来获取有关他们偏好的信息。我们证明了在递延感应（DA）机制下的排名报告中更大的同质性，并降低了信息获取，从而增加了对随机胜利的差异且最终效率低下的结果的依赖。因此，对于DA机制而言，至关重要的是，可以轻松获取学校信息以保持其效率。
In school choice, students make decisions based on their expectations of particular schools' suitability, and the decision to gather information about schools is influenced by the acceptance odds determined by the mechanism in place. We study a school choice model where students can obtain information about their preferences by incurring a cost. We demonstrate greater homogeneity in rank-order reports and reduced information acquisition under the Deferred-Acceptance (DA) mechanism, resulting in an increased reliance on random tie-breaking and ultimately inefficient outcomes. Thus, it is critical for the DA mechanism to have easy access to school information in order to maintain its efficiency.
