论文标题

对蓝牙和基于阶段的范围应用的模拟物理层中继攻击

Analog Physical-Layer Relay Attacks with Application to Bluetooth and Phase-Based Ranging

论文作者

Staat, Paul, Jansen, Kai, Zenger, Christian, Elders-Boll, Harald, Paar, Christof

论文摘要

如今,我们使用智能手机作为多功能设备,这些设备可以与环境通信以实施上下文感知的服务,包括资产跟踪,室内本地化,联系人跟踪或访问控制。作为事实上的标准,蓝牙几乎在每个智能手机中都可以提供短程无线通信。重要的是,许多蓝牙驱动的应用程序(例如电话)作为车辆和建筑物的钥匙(PAAK)都需要靠近合法设备,必须保护这些设备,以防止未经授权的访问。在较早的访问控制系统中,攻击者能够通过继电器站攻击违​​反接近性验证。但是,蓝牙针对此类攻击的脆弱性尚不清楚,因为现有的继电器攻击策略不适用或可以通过无线距离测量来打败。在本文中,我们根据低成本的现成无线电硬件设计和实施一个模拟物理层中继攻击,以同时增加无线通信范围并操纵距离测量值。使用我们的设置,我们成功地展示了针对基于蓝牙的汽车和智能锁的访问控制的中继攻击。此外,我们表明我们的攻击可以任意操纵基于多载波阶段的范围(MCPR),同时传达超过90 m的信号。

Today, we use smartphones as multi-purpose devices that communicate with their environment to implement context-aware services, including asset tracking, indoor localization, contact tracing, or access control. As a de-facto standard, Bluetooth is available in virtually every smartphone to provide short-range wireless communication. Importantly, many Bluetooth-driven applications such as Phone as a Key (PaaK) for vehicles and buildings require proximity of legitimate devices, which must be protected against unauthorized access. In earlier access control systems, attackers were able to violate proximity-verification through relay station attacks. However, the vulnerability of Bluetooth against such attacks was yet unclear as existing relay attack strategies are not applicable or can be defeated through wireless distance measurement. In this paper, we design and implement an analog physical-layer relay attack based on low-cost off-the-shelf radio hardware to simultaneously increase the wireless communication range and manipulate distance measurements. Using our setup, we successfully demonstrate relay attacks against Bluetooth-based access control of a car and a smart lock. Further, we show that our attack can arbitrarily manipulate Multi-Carrier Phase-based Ranging (MCPR) while relaying signals over 90 m.

扫码加入交流群

加入微信交流群

微信交流群二维码

扫码加入学术交流群,获取更多资源