论文标题
传感器攻击下非线性系统的控制器机密性
Controller confidentiality for nonlinear systems under sensor attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
传感器攻击下的控制器机密性是指在对手知道工厂和控制器的模型时，是否可以估算控制器的内部状态，而只能访问传感器，而不是执行器。我们表明，当可以检测到非线性闭环系统时，可以准确估算控制器的状态。在没有可检测性的情况下，控制器机密性仍然可以通过稳健的可观察性假设下的传感器进行定期探测方案而被违反，这允许在探测期间以任意准确性估算控制器的状态，并在非验证期间具有有限的误差。此外，可以通过选择适当的探测持续时间来保持隐身。这项研究表明，通过平衡估计精度和对手的隐身性，可以破坏非线性系统的控制器机密性。
Controller confidentiality under sensor attacks refers to whether the internal states of the controller can be estimated when the adversary knows the model of the plant and controller, while only having access to sensors, but not the actuators. We show that the controller's state can be estimated accurately when the nonlinear closed-loop system is detectable. In the absence of detectability, controller confidentiality can still be breached with a periodic probing scheme via the sensors under a robust observability assumption, which allows for the controller's state to be estimated with arbitrary accuracy during the probing period, and with bounded error during the non-probing period. Further, stealth can be maintained by choosing an appropriate probing duration. This study shows that the controller confidentiality for nonlinear systems can be breached by balancing the estimation precision and the stealthiness of the adversary.
