论文标题
转介在劳动力市场中固定，不平等和效率低下的作用
The Role of Referrals in Immobility, Inequality, and Inefficiency in Labor Markets
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了就业市场对推荐的严重依赖的后果。转介筛选候选人，并提高更好的匹配和提高的生产率，但是与就业工人几乎没有联系或没有联系的劣势寻求工作者，导致不平等增加。再加上同义的，转介也导致了固定的行动：人口群体的当前就业率低导致该群体的未来就业也相对较低。我们确定在人群中更均匀地分配推荐的条件不仅减少了不平等，而且可以提高未来的生产力和经济流动性。我们使用该模型来检查最佳策略，表明一次性平权行动政策涉及短期生产损失，但由于未来推荐的诱发变化而导致的平等，流动性和生产率的长期提高。我们还研究解雇工人的可能性如何改变推荐的影响。
We study the consequences of job markets' heavy reliance on referrals. Referrals screen candidates and lead to better matches and increased productivity, but disadvantage job-seekers who have few or no connections to employed workers, leading to increased inequality. Coupled with homophily, referrals also lead to immobility: a demographic group's low current employment rate leads that group to have relatively low future employment as well. We identify conditions under which distributing referrals more evenly across a population not only reduces inequality, but also improves future productivity and economic mobility. We use the model to examine optimal policies, showing that one-time affirmative action policies involve short-run production losses, but lead to long-term improvements in equality, mobility, and productivity due to induced changes in future referrals. We also examine how the possibility of firing workers changes the effects of referrals.
