论文标题
进化上稳定（MIS）规范：理论和应用
Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications
论文作者
论文摘要
为了解释有偏见的推论的持久性，我们提出了一个框架来评估战略环境中的竞争（MIS）规格。具有异质（MIS）规格的特工并存，并通过反复游戏对其环境提出贝叶斯的推论。 （MIS）规格的相对稳定性取决于其信徒的平衡收益。一个关键的机制是学习渠道：由于推断而引起的最佳答复的内生性。我们表征了一个理性的社会仅通过学习渠道而被某些错误指定的侵犯。学习渠道导致了新的稳定现象，并可以赋予进化的优势，以便在经济上相关的应用中有害偏见。
Toward explaining the persistence of biased inferences, we propose a framework to evaluate competing (mis)specifications in strategic settings. Agents with heterogeneous (mis)specifications coexist and draw Bayesian inferences about their environment through repeated play. The relative stability of (mis)specifications depends on their adherents' equilibrium payoffs. A key mechanism is the learning channel: the endogeneity of perceived best replies due to inference. We characterize when a rational society is only vulnerable to invasion by some misspecification through the learning channel. The learning channel leads to new stability phenomena, and can confer an evolutionary advantage to otherwise detrimental biases in economically relevant applications.
