论文标题
一种控制误差概率的新方法，用于检测诱饵状态量子键分布中的光子数 - 拆分攻击
A new method controlling the error probability for detecting the photon-number-splitting attack in the decoy-state quantum key distribution
论文作者
论文摘要
现有的诱饵量量子键分布（QKD）击败光子数 - 拆分（PNS）攻击提供了一种更准确的方法来估计安全钥匙速率，而它仍然认为只有单光子脉冲可以在任何情况下都能生成安全的键。但是，如果我们可以确认没有攻击，多光子脉冲也可以生成安全的键。在本文中，在无PNS攻击的零假设下，我们首先通过检索现有诱饵状态协议的丢失信息，提取Cauchy分布统计量，并进一步提供检测方法和I型错误概率来确定是否存在攻击。如果将结果判定为攻击，我们可以使用现有的诱饵态方法和GLLP公式来估计安全的密钥速率。否则，所有收到的脉冲都可以使用单光子脉冲和多光子脉冲，可用于生成键，在这种情况下，我们给出了安全的密钥速率。最后，我们执行的相关实验（即显着性水平为$ 5 \％$）显示了我们方法的正确性。
The existing decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) beating photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack provides a more accurate method to estimate secure key rate, while it still considers that only single-photon pulses can generate secure keys in any case. However, multiphoton pulses can also generate secure keys if we can confirm that there is no attack. In this paper, under the null hypothesis of no PNS attack, we first determine whether there is an attack or not by retrieving the missing information of the existing decoy-state protocols, extract a Cauchy distribution statistic, and further provide a detection method and the Type I error probability. If the result is judged to be an attack, we can use the existing decoy-state method and the GLLP formula to estimate secure key rate. Otherwise, all pulses received including both single-photon pulses and multiphoton pulses, can be used to generate the keys and we give the secure key rate in this case. Finally, the associated experiments we performed (i.e., the significance level is $5\%$) show the correctness of our method.
