论文标题
说服产生（钻石）悖论
Persuasion Produces the (Diamond) Paradox
论文作者
论文摘要
本文通过允许企业选择向访问消费者披露多少匹配价值信息来扩展Wolinsky（1986）的顺序搜索模型。这恢复了钻石悖论（Diamond 1971）：没有对称平衡的消费者进行积极的搜索，因此消费者获得零剩余，公司获得垄断利润。将场景修改为广告价格的方案，我们发现无活动的搜索结果持续存在，尽管结果对称平衡是公司以边际成本价格的价格。
This paper extends the sequential search model of Wolinsky (1986) by allowing firms to choose how much match value information to disclose to visiting consumers. This restores the Diamond paradox (Diamond 1971): there exist no symmetric equilibria in which consumers engage in active search, so consumers obtain zero surplus and firms obtain monopoly profits. Modifying the scenario to one in which prices are advertised, we discover that the no-active-search result persists, although the resulting symmetric equilibria are ones in which firms price at marginal cost.
