论文标题
说服一厢的思想家
Persuading a Wishful Thinker
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了一个说服力问题，其中发送者设计了信息结构来诱导非bayesian接收器采取特定动作。接收者私下了解他的偏好，是一厢情愿的思想家：他对最有利的结果有系统地过度占有率。我们表明，一厢情愿可以导致与贝叶斯案相比，每当发件人对接收者认为是他的决策问题中最佳结果的最佳结果时，与贝叶斯案相比，最佳说服力结构的定性转变。
We study a persuasion problem in which a sender designs an information structure to induce a non-Bayesian receiver to take a particular action. The receiver, who is privately informed about his preferences, is a wishful thinker: he is systematically overoptimistic about the most favorable outcomes. We show that wishful thinking can lead to a qualitative shift in the structure of optimal persuasion compared to the Bayesian case, whenever the sender is uncertain about what the receiver perceives as the best-case outcome in his decision problem.
