论文标题
激励措施邀请他人组成更大的联盟
Incentives to Invite Others to Form Larger Coalitions
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究合作游戏设置，因为最初的球员可以邀请更多球员，大联盟可能会发生变化。我们专注于单调游戏，即在大联盟中增加更多的球员并不有害。我们将邀请关系建模为有向的无环图。我们的目标是为这种新的合作游戏设置设计奖励分配机制，以激励玩家邀请新玩家。在本文中，我们提出了加权许可Shapley值（灵感来自许可结构和加权Shapley值）以实现目标。我们的解决方案提供了首次尝试激励球员在合作环境中通过私人邀请邀请更多的玩家组成更大的联盟的尝试。
We study a cooperative game setting where the grand coalition may change since the initial players can invite more players. We focus on monotone games, i.e., adding more players to the grand coalition is not harmful. We model the invitation relationship as a directed acyclic graph. Our goal is to design a reward distribution mechanism for this new cooperative game setting such that players are incentivized to invite new players. In this paper, we propose the weighted permission Shapley value (inspired by permission structure and the weighted Shapley value) to achieve the goal. Our solution offers the very first attempt to incentivize players to invite more players to form a larger coalition via their private invitations in cooperative settings.
