论文标题
参与式预算的端到端模型中的入围规则和激励措施
Shortlisting Rules and Incentives in an End-to-End Model for Participatory Budgeting
论文作者
论文摘要
我们介绍了以社会选择理论为基础的参与性预算的端到端模型。该模型解释了参与者提议入围项目的第一阶段，以及第二阶段，他们投票赞成哪个入围项目应资助。我们为第一阶段介绍了几个入围规则，并以规范性和算法术语分析了它们。我们的主要重点是参与者参与战略行为的激励措施，尤其是在第一阶段，他们需要推理他们的建议将如何影响第二阶段中每个人可用的策略范围。
We introduce an end-to-end model of participatory budgeting grounded in social choice theory. This model accounts for both the first stage, in which participants propose projects to be shortlisted, and the second stage, in which they vote on which of the shortlisted projects should be funded. We introduce several shortlisting rules for the first stage and we analyse them in both normative and algorithmic terms. Our main focus is on the incentives of participants to engage in strategic behaviour, especially in the first stage, in which they need to reason about how their proposals will impact the range of strategies available to everyone in the second stage.
