论文标题
帕累托有效的组合拍卖：二分偏见而无需准线性
Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了一个组合拍卖模型，其中代理对物体和付款捆绑的偏好不必是准线性的。但是，我们将代理的偏好限制为二分法。具有二分法偏好分区的代理商将一组对象捆绑成可接受的}和不可接受的代理，在相同的付款级别上，她在每个班级的捆绑包之间无动于衷，但严格地喜欢可接受的捆绑包。我们表明，如果偏好的领域包含所有二分法偏好，则没有帕累托有效的，主导的策略激励兼容（DSIC），单独的理性（IR）机制。但是，如果偏好的领域仅包含正收入效应二分法偏好，则VCG机制的概括是有效的，DSIC，IR和不满足的。我们显示了此结果的紧密度：在准线性二分法偏好的域中添加任何非分数偏好（满足某些自然特性），都会带回不可能的结果。
We consider a combinatorial auction model where preferences of agents over bundles of objects and payments need not be quasilinear. However, we restrict the preferences of agents to be dichotomous. An agent with dichotomous preference partitions the set of bundles of objects as acceptable} and unacceptable, and at the same payment level, she is indifferent between bundles in each class but strictly prefers acceptable to unacceptable bundles. We show that there is no Pareto efficient, dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), individually rational (IR) mechanism satisfying no subsidy if the domain of preferences includes all dichotomous preferences. However, a generalization of the VCG mechanism is Pareto efficient, DSIC, IR and satisfies no subsidy if the domain of preferences contains only positive income effect dichotomous preferences. We show the tightness of this result: adding any non-dichotomous preference (satisfying some natural properties) to the domain of quasilinear dichotomous preferences brings back the impossibility result.
