论文标题
EI-MTD:针对对抗攻击的边缘智能的目标防御
EI-MTD:Moving Target Defense for Edge Intelligence against Adversarial Attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
随着边缘情报的繁荣,它对对抗攻击的脆弱性成为一个紧迫的问题。所谓的对抗示例可以欺骗一个深入学习模型,以误解边缘节点。由于可转让性的属性,对手可以使用本地替代模型轻松地进行黑盒攻击。然而,边缘节点资源的局限性无法像在云数据中心那样提供复杂的防御机制。为了克服挑战,我们提出了一种动态防御机制,即EI-MTD。它首先通过从云数据中心上复杂的教师模型的差异知识蒸馏来获得具有较小尺寸的强大成员模型。然后,将基于贝叶斯Stackelberg游戏的动态调度策略应用于选择目标模型。这种动态防御可以禁止对手为黑盒攻击选择最佳的替代模型。我们的实验结果表明,这种动态调度可以有效地保护边缘智能免受黑箱设置下的对抗攻击。
With the boom of edge intelligence, its vulnerability to adversarial attacks becomes an urgent problem. The so-called adversarial example can fool a deep learning model on the edge node to misclassify. Due to the property of transferability, the adversary can easily make a black-box attack using a local substitute model. Nevertheless, the limitation of resource of edge nodes cannot afford a complicated defense mechanism as doing on the cloud data center. To overcome the challenge, we propose a dynamic defense mechanism, namely EI-MTD. It first obtains robust member models with small size through differential knowledge distillation from a complicated teacher model on the cloud data center. Then, a dynamic scheduling policy based on a Bayesian Stackelberg game is applied to the choice of a target model for service. This dynamic defense can prohibit the adversary from selecting an optimal substitute model for black-box attacks. Our experimental result shows that this dynamic scheduling can effectively protect edge intelligence against adversarial attacks under the black-box setting.