论文标题
制造商拍卖的最佳招标策略
Optimal Bidding Strategy for Maker Auctions
论文作者
论文摘要
制造商协议是一个分散的财务应用程序，可实现抵押贷款。该申请使用开放式，第二价格拍卖来完成其贷款清算过程。在本文中，我们为这些拍卖开发了招标功能，重点是参加拍卖的成本。然后，我们使用历史拍卖数据中的参数来优化这些成本，并将我们的最佳竞标价格与历史拍卖价格进行比较。我们发现，大多数拍卖的价格都比我们建议的最佳价格更高，我们为这些结果提出了几种理论。
The Maker Protocol is a decentralized finance application that enables collateralized lending. The application uses open-bid, second-price auctions to complete its loan liquidation process. In this paper, we develop a bidding function for these auctions, focusing on the costs incurred to participate in the auctions. We then optimize these costs using parameters from historical auction data, and compare our optimal bidding prices to the historical auction prices. We find that the majority of auctions end at higher prices than our recommended optimal prices, and we propose several theories for these results.
