论文标题
随着时变网络的强大联盟游戏的回报分配
Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们考虑了一系列可转让的公用事业（TU）联盟游戏，在该游戏中，联盟价值观未知但在某些范围内有所不同。为了解决由此产生的游戏系列，我们正式化了“强大的核心”的概念。我们的主要贡献是设计两种分布式算法，即分布式收益分配和分布式议价，它们会融合到可靠的核心中的共识分配中。我们采用了操作者理论观点，以显示在随时间变化的通信网络上执行的两种算法的融合。储能优化应用程序激发了我们“强大的联盟游戏”的框架。
In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) coalitional games where the coalitional values are unknown but vary within certain bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalise the notion of "robust CORE". Our main contribution is to design two distributed algorithms, namely, distributed payoff allocation and distributed bargaining, that converge to a consensual payoff distribution in the robust CORE. We adopt an operator-theoretic perspective to show convergence of both algorithms executed on time-varying communication networks. An energy storage optimization application motivates our framework for "robust coalitional games".
