论文标题
物理，决定论和大脑
Physics, Determinism, and the Brain
论文作者
论文摘要
本文回应说，即使我们不能希望在实践中执行所需的计算，即使我们不能希望进行基本的微物理学的因果关闭决定大脑的结果。 Following two papers of mine where I claim firstly that downward causation enables genuine causal powers to occur at higher emergent levels in biology (and hence in the brain) [arXiv:2004.13591], and that secondly causal closure is in reality an interlevel affair involving even social levels [arXiv:2006.00972], Carlo Rovelli has engaged with me in a dialogue where he forcefully restates the还原主义的位置，仅微物理学决定了所有问题，特别是大脑的功能。在这里，我深入回应了这一主张，声称如果人们首先考虑了同步出现和惯用性出现之间的差异，其次是认真对待生物学的良好确定本质，尤其是神经科学的性质，我的立场确实是正确的。
This paper responds to claims that causal closure of the underlying microphysics determines brain outcomes as a matter of principle, even if we cannot hope to ever carry out the needed calculations in practice. Following two papers of mine where I claim firstly that downward causation enables genuine causal powers to occur at higher emergent levels in biology (and hence in the brain) [arXiv:2004.13591], and that secondly causal closure is in reality an interlevel affair involving even social levels [arXiv:2006.00972], Carlo Rovelli has engaged with me in a dialogue where he forcefully restates the reductionist position that microphysics alone determines all, specifically the functioning of the brain. Here I respond to that claim in depth, claiming that if one firstly takes into account the difference between synchronic and diachronic emergence, and secondly takes seriously the well established nature of biology in general and neuroscience in particular, my position is indeed correct.
