论文标题
单调和在线公平部门
Monotone and Online Fair Division
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了一种新的但简单的在线公平部门模型，其中不可分割的物品一对一到达，并且代理商对这些物品捆绑有单调公用事业。我们考虑了该模型的机制的公理特性，例如防止策略，嫉妒和帕累托效率。我们证明了许多不可能的结果，这些结果证明了为什么我们考虑属性放松的原因，以及为什么我们考虑可以实现良好的公理特性的限制性偏好域。我们提出了两种机制，这些机制在受限但共同的偏好域中具有良好的公平性特性。
We study a new but simple model for online fair division in which indivisible items arrive one-by-one and agents have monotone utilities over bundles of the items. We consider axiomatic properties of mechanisms for this model such as strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, and Pareto efficiency. We prove a number of impossibility results that justify why we consider relaxations of the properties, as well as why we consider restricted preference domains on which good axiomatic properties can be achieved. We propose two mechanisms that have good axiomatic fairness properties on restricted but common preference domains.
