论文标题
偏见的平衡
Biased-Belief Equilibrium
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了在战略情况下如何扭曲但结构化的信念如何持续存在。具体来说，我们研究了两人游戏，其中每个玩家都具有有偏见的功能，代表了玩家对对手策略和实际策略的信念之间的差异。我们的平衡条件要求（i）每个玩家选择对对手策略的扭曲信念的最佳响应策略，以及（ii）失真功能彼此之间的最佳响应。我们对各种游戏中的稳定结果及其支持的稳定偏见获得了尖锐的预测和新颖的见解。
We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a player's beliefs about the opponent's strategy and the actual strategy. Our equilibrium condition requires that (i) each player choose a best-response strategy to his distorted belief about the opponent's strategy, and (ii) the distortion functions form best responses to one another. We obtain sharp predictions and novel insights into the set of stable outcomes and their supporting stable biases in various classes of games.
